Subsidies for health insurance for chronically ill, high-cost individuals may increase coverage in the broader population by improving the functioning of insurance markets. In this paper, we assess an historical example of a policy intervention of this sort, the extension of Medicare to the disabled, on the private insurance coverage of non-disabled individuals. We use data on insurance coverage from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from before and after the extension of Medicare to the disabled to estimate the effect of the program on private insurance coverage rates in the broader population. We find that the insurance coverage of individuals who had a health condition that limited their ability to work increased significantly in states with high versus low rates of disability.
INTRODUCTION
Providing affordable health insurance for chronically ill people who have predictably high medical expenses is one of health policy's most vexing problems. One response of legislators has been to regulate the prices or terms at which insurance can be sold. For example, some states have adopted mandatory community rating in the smallgroup or individual markets, which requires insurers to sell to any applicant and prohibits them from setting premiums based on expected health spending (except for a specified set of characteristics such as age, gender, or geographic area). To encourage pooling in employer-sponsored and other group insurance plans, the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 prohibits such plans from charging an individual more because of any health factor. However, the effects of these regulations on social welfare are ambiguous.
Restrictions on prices and terms may enhance the ability of individuals with high expected costs to obtain insurance, but may also lead to increases in premiums that reduce coverage of individuals with low expected costs. The policies' net effect depends on the relative magnitude of the welfare gains from increases in coverage of high-cost individuals and the welfare losses from decreases in coverage of low-cost individuals.
A second response has been the creation of state high-risk pools, which provide subsidized coverage to people who have sought insurance in the individual market but have been unable to obtain it or able to obtain it only at a high price. However, as they have been implemented, high-risk pools suffer from some of the same shortcomings as community rating. They are frequently financed by a tax on insurance, which leads to coverage declines that are proportional to the size of the pool. In addition, many high-risk pools have sought to control costs by limiting enrollment through arbitrary mechanisms which further limit their effectiveness.
Thus, it is not surprising that some researchers have suggested targeted subsidization of individuals with high expected health costs as an alternative. Such a subsidy can take the form of a voucher or capitation payment from the government or a private market-maker. It can also take the form of a promise by the government to reimburse insurers for a predetermined fraction of their high-cost subscribers' liabilities (see van Barneveld, van Vliet, and van de Ven, 1996) . This method effectively charges high-cost individuals something akin to a community rate, but without forcing low-cost individuals to finance the cost (Holahan, et al., 2003) . Ideally, such subsidies would not only increase coverage of the high-cost individuals that received them but would also increase the coverage of unsubsidized individuals. In contrast to community rating and risk pools, subsidies to the chronically ill could lead to lower prices or more comprehensive benefits in the broader private insurance market.
Nonetheless, subsidies to high-cost individuals also have an ambiguous effect on social welfare: although they increase insurance coverage, they require distortionary taxation to raise the revenue needed to finance them. The relative merit of these approaches is therefore an empirical question.
Despite the importance of this issue, there is little evidence of how a system that avoided the shortcomings of community rating and high-risk pools would perform. In this paper, we assess an historical example of a policy intervention of this sort, the extension of Medicare to the disabled, on the private insurance coverage of non-disabled individuals. In 1973, Congress extended Medicare benefits to beneficiaries of the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program; prior to then, there was no uniform, comprehensive public insurance program for the disabled. More important for the purposes of our study, extending Medicare to the disabled also had the effect of removing high-cost individuals from the broader pool of the privately insured.
No empirical evidence exists of the impact of this policy, or similar policies, on the private insurance coverage of non-disabled individuals. Providing this evidence is important: If removing the disabled from the private insurance market increases private insurance coverage of the nondisabled, then public subsidization of high-cost individuals may be an effective strategy to improve social welfare.
We use data on insurance coverage from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from before and after the extension of Medicare to the disabled to estimate the effect of the program on private insurance coverage rates in the broader population. We find that the insurance coverage of individuals who had a health condition that limited their ability to work increased significantly in states with high versus low rates of SSDI beneficiaries. Thus, the expansion of Medicare not only increased coverage among the targeted population of the disabled, but also among people who were similarly situated but less seriously impaired, suggesting the potential usefulness of subsidies to high-cost individuals in promoting insurance coverage generally.
Then, we use data from the Health Insurance Council 1 from 1970-1980 to estimate the effect of the extension of Medicare on private insurance comprehensiveness.
There are several mechanisms through which the extension of Medicare could have had spillover effects; one is by leading to increases in the comprehensiveness of coverage.
We find that the comprehensiveness of private health insurance increased significantly after versus before the extension of Medicare in states with high versus low rates of SSDI beneficiaries. We interpret this finding as supporting a causal interpretation of our estimates.
Our analysis proceeds in the next five sections. Section II reviews previous work on the topic of insurance coverage for high-cost individuals. In section III we discuss the data we use for our analysis, describe our methodological approach, and present tabular results which show evidence of a large impact of the extension of Medicare on nondisabled coverage rates. We embed this analysis in a more general econometric model in Section IV and present results. In section V, we estimate the effect of the extension of Medicare on the scope of the policy offerings of private insurers. Section VI concludes.
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
A substantial existing body of research investigates the effect of policies that are designed to increase the insurance coverage of high-cost individuals. Most of this research has focused on restrictions on price such as mandatory community rating.
Although studies differ on the magnitude of the effects of such regulation, all agree that any increase in coverage enjoyed by high-cost individuals is accompanied by an increase in premiums for and a decrease in coverage of low-cost individuals (Dobson, Lampkin, and Litow, 2003; Monheit and Schone, 2003; Davidoff, Blumberg, and Nichols, 2005; Simon, 2005) . Other work has examined the consequences of state high-risk pools. For various reasons, high-risk pools have also failed to provide a comprehensive solution (see Fernandez and Stone, 2006 and Achman and Chollet, 2001 for excellent reviews).
An alternative option provides a voucher or subsidy, funded with general revenue, to high-cost individuals for the purchase of private insurance. Although these policies have been debated in theory (van de Ven, 2000; Swartz, 2003) , little research exists on their actual performance. Van Barneveld, et al. (1996) offer an important exception. They propose a system under which private insurers would be allowed periodically to nominate a small fraction of members whose costs would be partially borne by the public sector. Using data from the Netherlands, they show that such a system may substantially reduce premiums for high-cost individuals.
In theory, targeted subsidies could increase the coverage not only of those who received the subsidy but also of those who did not. Such subsidies could increase coverage of other high-cost individuals, low-cost individuals, or both. If subsidized individuals were pooled with all unsubsidized individuals, and private insurance policy offerings did not change in response to the subsidy, then everyone's premiums would fall by the same amount. However, if subsidized individuals were pooled with individuals who had similar observable characteristics, then the premiums of high-cost individuals would fall by more than the premiums of their low-cost counterparts. In addition, private insurance policy offerings might change in response to the subsidy. Removal of some high-cost individuals from the population, even in the presence of full pooling, could lead insurers to increase the comprehensiveness of their plans (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000) .
Which individuals benefit from the spillover effects of targeted subsidies therefore depends on the extent of pooling and of differences in individuals' elasticity of demand for comprehensiveness.
Yet, little research has sought to investigate how a system that avoided the shortcomings of community rating and high-risk pools would perform. In this paper, we assess the effects of the extension of Medicare to the disabled on the private insurance coverage of non-disabled individuals. Medicare for the disabled is like a high-risk pool, but with broad-based financing and uncapped (although restrictive) eligibility. 2 To date, however, no work has provided empirical evidence of such a scheme's incentives in the United States. This paper seeks to fill this gap. We examine a "natural experiment" from the recent past -the extension of Medicare in 1973 to disabled individuals receiving SSDI. This policy had the effect of removing individuals with high expected health costs from private health insurance pools. We estimate the impact of this policy on the coverage of both the population at large and a high-cost segment of the population who was at risk of becoming, but had not yet become, disabled -individuals who are limited in the kind or amount of work they can do ("work-limited" individuals). We compare trends in coverage of these individuals before versus after the extension of Medicare in states with large versus small SSDI populations. In so doing, we can assess the potential effectiveness of subsidization of high-cost individuals as a policy to improve the functioning of private markets.
III. DATA AND ESTIMATION APPROACH

A. Data
To identify health insurance coverage rates, we use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), waves 2-5 and 13 (that is, 1969-1972 and 1980) . In each of these years, the PSID asked heads of household whether they were "covered by some hospital or medical insurance, like Blue Cross" except in 1980, when it asked whether they were "covered by some hospital or medical insurance, like Medicare, Blue Cross, or Blue Shield." (The health insurance question was not asked in any year 1973-1979.) Our sample is limited to persons age 64 or less, and we omitted all individuals whose response to this question was missing. In each of these years, the PSID also asked heads of household whether they had a "physical or nervous condition that limits the kind or amount of work" they could do. In 1980, 17.4 percent of the population answered yes to this question (in all years, 19 percent answered yes); we classify these individuals as "work-limited" in our subsequent analysis. Table 2 shows how we classify states based on their rates of SSDI receipt. We coded a state as "high disability" if its disability rate in a given year was above the population-weighted median; we coded it as "low disability" if its disability rate was below the median. The first row contains the list of states in each study year that have above the population-weighted median level of SSDI. The remaining rows provide the median SSDI rate, the 25th -75th interquartile range of SSDI rates, and the average SSDI rates in high-and low-disability states. In 1980, for example, the median rate of SSDI receipt was 1.37 percent (based on the interquartile range of 1.21, 1.52 percent). 
B. B. The Effect of Medicare for the Disabled on Private Insurance Coverage
Rates
IV. ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND RESULTS
A. Models
To explore these possibilities, we specify a model of insurance coverage. We analyze individual heads of household i = 1,…, N in states j = 1,…, 50 for the years t = 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1980 . An individual has characteristics X ijt that include age, gender, family size, family income, education, occupation, whether self-employed, and whether out of the labor force. We define age as a series of indicator variables denoting whether the individual is a newborn, age 19-34, age 35-44, age 45-54, or age 55-64 (age 1-18 is the omitted group). We define family income as two indicator variables, one for families with incomes between $8,000 and $24,999 (in 1980 dollars), and one for families with incomes greater than $24,999 (income less than $8,000 is omitted group).
We define educational attainment as a series of indicator variables denoting whether the individual is high-school-educated, has some college education, or is a college graduate (less-than high school education is the omitted group); occupation is an indicator variable for whether the policyholder is a professional or technical worker (all other occupations are the omitted group). We use the variable W ijt to capture whether an individual is worklimited.
Our models specify insurance coverage, C ijt, as a function of state fixed effects, α j, and time fixed effects, θ t ; state Medicaid enrollment rates, M jt ; the characteristics of individuals, X ijt and W ijt ; a variable capturing the state's SSDI enrollment rate, D jt ;
interactions between D jt , W ijt , and an indicator for 1980 (the only study period after the extension of Medicare); and an individual-specific error term ε ijt :
C ijt = α j + θ t + δM jt + X ijt β + W ijt γ + π 1 D jt + π 2 (D jt * W ijt )+ π 3 (W ijt * I t (t=1980)) + π 4 (D jt * I t (t=1980)) + π 5 (D jt * W ijt * I t (t=1980)) + ε ijt.
(1)
The coefficient π 5 is the DDD effect of the extension of Medicare-that is, the differential trend in coverage in high-versus low-disability states, for work-limited individuals relative to those who are not work-limited. Table 4 reports estimates of π, γ, and δ from equation (1). The results show that the simple DD and DDD estimators from (1) to column (2) shows that the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of individual characteristics X ijt . We also reestimated models (1) and (2) without controls for state Medicaid enrollment rates; this did not change the results at all.
B. Results
The results in column (4) show that the estimated effect declines in a linear specification, but it remains economically and statistically significant. According to that model, an increase in the state SSDI rate of 0.5 percentage-point leads to a 7.8 (=0.5*15.5) percentage point increase in the coverage of work-limited versus not worklimited individuals (standard error 3 percentage points). By comparison, the results in column (2) suggest that an increase in the state SSDI rate of 0.5 percentage points from 1.2 to 1.7 percentage points leads to a 13.3 percentage point increase in the trend in relative coverage rates.
V. IDENTIFYING THE MECHANISM UNDERLYING THE EFFECTS OF THE EXTENSION OF MEDICARE
To investigate how the extension of Medicare might have had these effects, we use data from the Health Insurance Council from 1970-1980. The concentration of the spillover coverage increase among the work-limited suggests that a mechanism other than price is at work. The fact that most private health insurance was (and is) obtained through employers at pooled premiums means that policy offerings had to change in order to achieve the result we observe.
To investigate whether this was so, we construct a measure of the Q jt = α j + θ t + δM jt + βC jt + π 1 D jt +π 2 (D jt * I t (t ≥ 1973)) + ε jt.
and Q jt = α j + θ t + δM jt + βC jt + π 1 D jt + π 2 (D jt * I t (1975 ≥ t ≥ 1973) ) + π 3 (D jt * I t (t ≥ 1976) ) + ε jt.
and Q jt = α j + θ t + δM jt + βC jt + π 1 D jt +π 2 (D jt * I t (t ≥ 1976)) + ε jt.
Each of these specifications makes a slightly different assumption about the timing of the effect of interest. Model (2a) assumes that private insurance markets responded immediately to Medicare's coverage of the disabled. Models (2b) and (2c) assume that markets responded with a lag. Model (2b) estimates both the short-run and long-run effects, whereas model (2c) constrains the short-run effect to be zero. Table 5 presents estimates from these models. The table shows that the comprehensiveness of private coverage expanded more in response to Medicare in states that had large disabled populations than in states that did not. Depending on specification, the share of hospital insurance policies that also provided medical expense coverage grew between 2.5 and 4.4 percentage points more in high-disability states.
Descriptive statistics not presented in any table show that this effect was due to comprehensiveness starting lower in high-disability states, but catching up coincident with the extension of Medicare. In 1970, the proportion of hospital insurance policies that provided medical expense coverage was 75.9 percent in high-disability states and 84.7 percent in low-disability states. In 1973, the proportions were 82.5 and 86.5 percent; by 1980, the proportions had become almost identical, at 89.5 and 90.6 percent.
We interpret these effects as evidence that our estimates of the effects of Medicare on private coverage rates are causal.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Using an important policy natural experiment, we have estimated the extent to which subsidies to cover high-cost individuals affect insurance coverage of others.
According to our estimates, extension of Medicare to an additional 0.5 percent of the population through the Social Security Disability Insurance program led to an increase in private insurance coverage of between 7.8 and 13.3 percentage points among individuals who described themselves as limited in the kind or amount of work that they can do.
Although we measure this effect for work-limited individuals, one can extrapolate its significance to the population at large. In 1980, these work-limited individuals were 15.7 percent of the total population. Thus, extending Medicare to an additional 0.5 percentage points of the population increased total insurance coverage by 1.2 -2.1 percentage points.
To calculate the effect of the extension of Medicare on the net increase in private coverage, however, requires an estimate of the extension's crowding-out -that is, the share of newly-covered beneficiaries who already had private insurance. Although our data do not enable us to identify this, our estimates suggest that, even if we assume complete crowding out, extending Medicare coverage to an additional 0.5 percentage points of the disabled increased private insurance coverage in the rest of the population by between 0.7 ( = 1.2 -0.5) and 1.6 (= 2.1 -0.5) percentage points. Thus, this increase implies that subsidizing individuals with high expected health costs is an effective way to increase the private insurance coverage of other high-cost individuals.
In addition, our results can be used to calculate the marginal "target efficiency" of extending Medicare to the disabled in the 1970s. Gruber (2003) , for example, suggests evaluating such programs in terms of a "bang for the buck" -the total government spending per dollar of insurance cost covered (that is, the cost per newly insured weighted by the cost of those who are gaining insurance). Medicaid expansions to lowincome adults, according to Gruber, have a budget cost of $1.30 per dollar of previously uncovered health costs. The budget cost exceeds $1.00 because of crowding-out of private coverage; for every $1.00 the government spends to newly insure someone with
Medicaid, it must also give insurance to some number of individuals who would have had private coverage.
Using the midpoint of our range of estimates of the extent of crowding-in of the non-disabled population of 1.65 percentage points (1.65 = ((1.2 + 2.1) / 2)) per 0.5 percentage points of Medicare expansion, the formula for the target efficiency of the program is:
where λ is the extent of crowding-out of private insurance by Medicare; c d is the cost of public insurance for a newly covered disabled person; and c n is the cost of private insurance for a newly covered non-disabled person.
As the formula shows, one cannot calculate the target efficiency of the policy without information on extent of crowding-out of the program, the health spending of the newly covered disabled individuals, and the health spending of the newly covered nondisabled individuals. However, it is possible to calculate the conditions under which it is more target-efficient than a typical Medicaid expansion, 4 or under which it achieves a target efficiency of less than one dollar per dollar of previously uncovered health costs -that is, no target efficiency cost. For example, assuming complete crowding-out of private insurance coverage (λ = 1) for the disabled, the target efficiency of the program reduces to 0.5c d / 1.15c n . Thus, even with 100 percent crowd-out, the program is still more target-efficient than a typical Medicaid expansion, as long as 0. Our findings also suggest the desirability of examining further the consequences for insurance pricing and coverage of programs that would subsidize the costs of private insurance of high (catastrophic and/or persistent) cost individuals. Cogan, Hubbard, and Kessler (2005) , for example, propose a subsidy for insurance for chronically ill individuals whose health care expenses exceed a specified multiple of that person's areaaverage expenses. Notes: Reported statistics are calculated using PSID population weights. Note: Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors allowing for within-state correlation are in parentheses. Estimates are calculated using PSID sample weights. N = 22,402, and the number of states (and number of clusters) is 50. 
